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   The Collapse of the 1995 Highway 1 Bridge in 1995 caused a 400 km detour to get around the collapsed 
bridge.  The clues from design and maintenance reports will be followed including channel bed degradation 
and local scour estimates to determine the cause of the bridge failure and potential missed opportunities to 
fix the bridge before it collapsed.  The economic consequences of the bridge failure including lost 
opportunity cost will be summarized. 
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1.   FOLLOWING THE CLUES 
(1) Setting the Scene 
   The project site is located just outside of the City 
of Carmel located in Monterey County in Central 
California as shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1:  Location Map within California 
As shown in Figure 2, there have been three state 
highway bridges at the site and a pedestrian bridge is 
proposed.  
 
 Figure 2:  Past, Present and Future Bridges at the Site (basemap 
from googleearth.com). 
 
The earliest bridge with records available was 
constructed in 1909.   This 1909 timber bridge was 
replaced in 1934 with a bridge upstream because the 
timber piles and deck were rotting and the bridge was 
settling.  The 1934 bridge was replaced in 1995 with a 
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reinforced concrete box girder bridge upstream when 
three spans of the 1934 bridge washed into the river 
on March 10, 1995.  A pedestrian bridge is currently 
proposed upstream of the 1995 Route 1 Bridge as part 
of a pedestrian and bicycle corridor planned by the 
Transportation Agency of Monterey County 
(TAMC).   
The Carmel River is a central California coastal 
stream that drains a 23.7 sq meters watershed to the 
Pacific Ocean (Figure 3).  The river has two dams on 
its mainstem:  the 25.9 m high San Clemente Dam 
located at Rivermile (RM) 18.6 and the 42.1 m high 
Los Padres Dam located at RM 23.5. 
 
Figure 3.  Carmel River Basin (from Monterey Peninsula Water 
Management District). 
The gage upstream of the bridge (Carmel River 
near Carmel, Gage #11143250) has been in place 
since 1964.  The highest recorded discharge was 453 
cubic meters per second (cms) on March 10, 1995 
when the bridge failed as shown in Figure 4.   
 
Figure 4:  Discharges at the Carmel River Gage near Carmel 
(note discharges in cubic feet per second) 
The FEMA study estimated the 50-year discharge 
to be 651 cms and 100-year discharge to be 824 cms 
(FEMA, 1991).  The March 10, 1995 discharge of 453 
cms equates to approximately a 30-year discharge 
assuming the above hydrology is valid.   The 
proposed pedestrian and bicycle bridge over the 
Carmel River provides an excellent opportunity to see 
if the forensic clues that led to the March 10, 1995 
Carmel River bridge failure can be used to enhance 
the longevity and survivability of the new bridge 
under a variety of flood events. 
(2) Clue #1:  1934 Bridge Design 
The 1934 Carmel River Bridge was constructed 
approximately 43 m upstream of a timber through 
truss and trestle spans constructed in 1909.  The 
bridge had four 20.1 m timber through trusses on 
“mass concrete” on timber piles in the main channel 
and eleven 6.7 m timber trestle spans on timber piles.  
The old bridge was 155.4 m long and 5.5 m wide and 
had a soffit elevation of 7.4 m.  Note all elevations are 
in National Geodetic Vertical Datum of 1929 which is 
the datum of the as-built plans for the 1934 bridge. 
The 1909 bridge was replaced because the piles 
under the trestle and other parts of the bridge were 
badly rotted out making the bridge structurally 
unsafe.  The north pier had settled .3 m or more and 
the trusses had been blocked up (to prevent more 
settlement).  The waterway under the trestle portion 
had been seriously encroached upon by a network of 
bracing placed there not long before. (State of 
California, 1931). 
The 1934 bridge was designed for a 75-year 
discharge of 496 cms  – only slightly larger than the 
453 cms that destroyed the bridge.  At the time of the 
bridge design, there were no dams on the Carmel 
River, and the “high-water” was estimated to be at 
elevation 6.1 m. The soffit elevation was 
recommended at 6.7 m while another portion of the 
report notes that the “elevation of high-water taken 
from contour map on data by Mr. Mitchell, 22.0” 
(State of California, 1931). 
The bridge which was designed was made longer 
(158.5 m instead of the proposed 146.3 m) than the 
preliminary recommendations.  In addition, a vertical 
curve with a maximum soffit elevation of 7.9 m and 
minimum soffit elevation of 7.6 m was added 
provided as shown in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5:  Ground Elevations and Profile of the 1934 Bridge 
(meters) 
The 1934 bridge was designed assuming no cutting 
down (degradation) and probable silting up, given its 
proximity to the ocean.  Interestingly, the proposed 
materials for the bridge were gravel transported by 
rail from Monterey as well as sand from the 
streambed.  The report noted an open commercial 
sand pit 183 m  upstream of the bridge.  This may 
have contributed to the degradation noted below. 
(3) Clue #2:  Maintenance Records 
The maintenance records for the 1934 bridge 
(Caltrans, August 1995) indicate significant drift 
caught on the piers between 1955 and 1986.  In 1972, 
the encroachment of a cultivated field encroaching 
into the waterway between Abutment 1 and Pier 10 
was detailed.  This encroachment prompted the 
inspector to decrease the waterway adequacy of the 
bridge, and may have contributed to the amount of 
water flowing under the bridge instead of out into the 
historic floodplain.  In 1958, structural damage of 
Piers 11 and 12 was detailed, and the upstream pile of 
Pier 6 was also knocked out of plumb.  Later in 1977, 
the 5th pile in the bent is noted as being cracked and 
Pier 12 was the first pier to fail in 1955.  The 1991 
report notes that the bridge was placed in the 
maintenance program for pile encasement of Piers 10, 
11 and 12 (the bridge predated the Caltrans Scour 
Countermeasure program which started in 1997). 
(4) Clue #3:  Cross Sections 
A cross section was taken on March 2, 1995, just 8 
days before the bridge failed.  According to the cross 
section information (see Figure 5), the river degraded 
approximately 1-meter between 1931 and 1995.  The 
degradation decreased the pile embedment from it 
original 5 m at Pier 12 and 5.4 m at Pier 11 to 4 m at 
Pier 12 and 4.4 m at Pier 11.  The original estimated 
pile penetration was 5.5 m according to the 1931 
Preliminary Investigations Report (State of 
California, 1931), which is greater than the actual 
penetration achieved in construction. 
(5) Scene Reconstruction:  Hydraulic Model 
A hydraulic model (HEC-RAS) set up by Balance 
Hydrologics, Inc. was utilized to estimate the 
hydraulics at the bridge as it was in 1995.  Although 
the model utilizes the 2007 topography, if the record 
discharge of 453 cms is contained in the channel, it 
provides an estimate of the water surface elevation 
and velocity for the old Highway 1 Bridge as shown 
in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6: Output from HEC-RAS Hydraulic Model 
(6) Clue #4:  Debris and Pressure Flow 
Debris pummeling the bridge was caught on amateur 
video late Friday afternoon just hours before the bridge 
collapsed by a local resident who commented that it 
“felt like an earthquake.”   The documented debris 
included debris rafts and large trees, which were over 
30.5 m long with 1.8 m diameter root-balls.  The water 
was at or near the soffit of the bridge with significant 
debris catching on the piers.  Debris lodged on a pier 
can increase local scour at the pier by increasing the 
pier width and deflecting a component of flow 
downward.  HEC-18 recommends estimating the scour 
depth by assuming the pier width is larger than the 
actual pier width and notes the problem is determining 
the increase in pier width to use in the pier scour 
equation.  According to HEC-18, limited studies of 
pressure flow scour indicate that pier scour can increase 
200 to 300% for a bridge under pressure flow 
(Richardson et. al., 2001). 
With relatively small piers (0.46 m), the pier scour 
is 1.1 m.  This leaves 3 to 3.3 m of pile embedment.  If 
the pier width is assumed to double due to debris, the 
pile embedment is decreased to 1.8 to 2.1 m.  
Likewise, if the pier scour depth is doubled or tripled, 
the pile embedment is dramatically decreased.   
According to the video (MPWMD, 2008), Pier 12 
was the first pier to fail with 0.3 to 0.5 m of settlement 
showing as the bridge began to collapse..  Later video 
shows the complete loss of Span 12 and the tipping of 
Span 11 into the water.  By morning, Spans 10-12 had 
disappeared into the river with just a downstream gas 
line spanning the 36.6 m opening.   
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(7) Follow the Clues . . .  
The four factors leading to the bridge failure 
presented above include: Clue #1: 1934 study 
underestimating the discharge and potential 
degradation; Clue #2: Waterway encroachment and 
structural damage concentrating the flows and 
possibly weakening the bridge; Clue #3:  Channel bed 
degradation decreasing the pile embedment; and Clue 
#4:  Debris and pressure flow putting stress on the 
bridge.  To sum up, the combination of relatively 
small pile embedment, pressure flow scour, debris 
and impact loading from large trees floating down the 
river likely caused the bridge failure. 
2. TEMPORARY AND PERMANENT BRIDGES 
In order to open the route to traffic as quickly as 
possible, a Bailey bridge which was stored at the 
Caltrans Maintenance yard at the San Francisco 
Oakland Bay Bridge was trucked down from Oakland 
to Carmel.  The turnaround was fast: the 1934 bridge 
failed late Friday March 10th.  The Bailey bridge was 
“designed” and loaded on trucks on Saturday, March 
11th.  The new bridge erection started on Sunday and 
was completed Thursday, March 16th (see Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7:  Looking downstream at Bailey Bridge Launching in 
March, 1995 (photo by Steve Ng, Caltrans) 
The new bridge was designed while the Bailey 
bridge was under construction. The recommendations 
were 0.9 m of freeboard over the estimated water 
surface elevation during the 1995 storms with 30.5 m 
spans.  Work started on the permanent bridge on April 
1, 1995.  It was opened to traffic on May 5, 1995 and 
was completed by September 1995 (the training walls 
were installed after traffic), as shown in Figure 8.  The 
bridge cost almost $3.5 million U.S. dollars (Caltrans, 
September 1995). 
 
Figure 8:  New Highway 1 Bridge with Pier Wall Construction 
under way (photo by Author, 1995) 
Since the bridge was constructed, significant 
analysis and improvements to the channel have been 
made.  The County of Monterey is currently 
completing a “restudy” of the FEMA floodplain.  This 
analysis shows a decrease in the water surface 
elevation due to the removal of some levees and 
improvement to the downstream lagoon.  These 
improvements are lowering the anticipated water 
surface elevation as the channel uses more of its 
historic floodplain.  The proposed pedestrian bridge 
was designed with 0.9 m of freeboard above the 
revised 50-year discharge to allow debris to pass 
under the bridge.  30.5 m long spans that line up with 
the downstream Route 1 Bridge were also 
recommended.   
3. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES 
There is significant economic cost associated with 
channel bed degradation and lateral channel 
migration.  This includes not only the cost of repairing 
or replacing the bridge, but also the lost opportunity 
cost associated with significant detours and/or traffic 
delays.   
Due to the bridge wash-out, the trip from Carmel 
Highlands to Carmel was increased from 15 minutes 
to 6.5 hours due to the 400 kilometer detour (San Jose 
Mercury News, 1995). Some researchers have 
attempted to estimate the lost opportunity cost 
associated with detours.  A 1986 study in Texas 
estimated the value of time to be $8.00 per 
vehicle-hour for drivers, $10.40 per vehicle-hour for 
passenger vehicles (assume 1.3 persons per vehicle) 
and $19.00 per vehicle-hour for trucks (McFarlan and 
Chui, 1986). These costs are approximately 20% 
higher when updated to 1996 dollars (Caltrans, 1996), 
or $9.60/veh-hr for drivers, $12.48/veh-hr for 
passenger vehicles, and $22.80/veh-hr for trucks. 
Therefore, the cost to an individual driver (in 1995 
U.S. dollars) to drive from Carmel Highlands to 
Carmel was increased from $2.40 to $62.40 when the 
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bridge collapsed.  Examining the cost of alternative 
transportation can validate this cost.  During the 6 
days between the bridge collapse and the temporary 
bridge erection, the only alternative to the 6.5 hour 
detour was a helicopter trip from one side of the river 
to the other taking less than 5 minutes.  The $50 
helicopter trip each way approximates the $60 detour 
“cost.” 
Had there not been 6 days of temporary bridge 
erection, there would have been an Average Daily 
Traffic (ADT) of 12,000 cars with 3% being trucks.  
At the costs described earlier, this equates to a lost 
opportunity cost of $5.7 million for cars and $320,000 
for trucks or a total opportunity cost to the public of 
over $6 million.  The temporary Bailey bridge 
restricted the traffic to one-way, causing an estimated 
15-minute delay.   Furthermore, to get the new bridge 
opened as soon possible, a $20,000 per day incentive 
was provided to the contractor.  The bridge was 
completed 17 days ahead of schedule, netting the 
contractor a $340,000 bonus.  The estimated lost 
opportunity cost for the 15 minute delay was 
$650,000 for the cars and trucks--which was twice the 
contractor bonus--proving that economic incentives 
work (Avila, 1998). 
4. CONCLUSION 
Following the clues showed that the bridge failed 
due to several factors: inadequate pile embedment 
exacerbated by channel bed degradation, a storm 
which brought water high enough to cause pressure 
flow, and significant debris pummeling the bridge. 
These clues provide a useful framework for 
evaluating existing and future bridges that face 
similar conditions and challenges. They also illustrate 
the value of bridge engineers understanding and 
interpreting maintenance and inspection reports 
during routine engineering assessments of existing 
bridges.  In the case of the 1995 Carmel River bridge 
failure, a temporary bridge was quickly erected to 
bring the 6.5 hour detour down to approximately 15 
minutes.  The replacement bridge was designed and 
constructed ahead of schedule netting the contractor a 
bonus which was less than the delay “cost” to the 
traveling public.  
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